'Tis the Offensive Season

But What's Preventing a Breakthrough to Crimea?

With the winter setting and the spring dawning across Europe, perhaps nowhere has the spring season been so anxiously anticipated than it is in Ukraine. The winter has seen Ukraine try to hold the line against a grinding Russian advance. Simultaneously, they have been attempting to build up their forces in the rear to launch a much-hyped spring offensive. Much of the talk around this spring offensive has been centered around Ukraine’s likelihood of success against a seemingly well-prepared Russian defensive line.
First, let's recap on how we got to this point. Talk of the Ukrainian spring offensive really began when General Zaluzhny, head of Ukraine’s Armed Forces, gave an interview to The Economist back in December 2022. His requests for various pieces of equipment initially seemed a tall order. However, immediately after, in January 2023, Western nations began to pledge vast amounts of military equipment — all the way up to and including main battle tanks. Some nations went all in, literally emptying or severely depleting their armouries of certain equipment. Take for example Denmark,  who donated all of their Caesar howitzers, or Britain, who donated 30 AS90s, leaving some of their artillery units with no heavy guns. By the time the Ramstein meeting had concluded in late January, it was clear that Ukraine would be able to scrape together enough equipment to launch some sort of offensive, even if the donations didn't quite meet Zaluzhny’s initial wishes.

Since January, Ukraine and the West have talked openly about an offensive from the Zaporizhzhia region, advancing south to seize Melitopol and eventually cutting the Crimean land bridge. This would divide Russian forces, isolating those forces in Kherson and Crimea, and potentially leaving Crimea open to recapture. For its part, Russia has spent the last 6 months building an extensive network of fortifications and obstacles along almost the entire front line (map). 

To understand the motif behind Russia’s decision to create an elaborate series of obstacles and fortifications we have to recognise the threat facing Russian forces. Throughout this conflict Russia has had a significant firepower advantage over Ukraine. This has enabled them to conduct mass fires against entrenched Ukrainian positions as well as concentrate overwhelming and devastating barrages on advancing columns of Ukrainian armour and manpower like we witnessed during the Kherson offensive. 

In response to this, Ukraine, under the guidance of NATO and with its advantage in manpower, implemented the use of small units.  We witnessed Ukraine employ them to great effect in the Kharkov offensive. In essence, what Ukraine did was swarm Russian positions utilising multiple small mobile formations to rapidly advance across the battlefield through the grey zone, amassing on key targets in the rear such as artillery firing points, supply lines, etc. Although Russia was able to inflict significant losses on advancing Ukrainian units, it was ultimately unable to bring its firepower superiority to bear and stop the Ukrainian advance.

Building an Obstacle Course

It is important to understand that obstacles are employed to achieve a certain predetermined objective. They are not there to simply 'stop' or block an enemy. Some may have the goal of delaying the enemy's advance, while others may have the goal of channelling the enemy along desired routes. 

Furthermore, the same type of obstacle can be employed to achieve different objectives. For example, a minefield can be deployed to block, delay, or channel. A fortification is simply an area, object or building that has been strengthened so it can better withstand an attack. All obstacles fall within the remit of counter-mobility, that is, to deny the enemy the freedom of movement on the battlefield. 

It is for this fundamental reason why Russia opted to erect a vast network of obstacles and fortifications across the entire front line. These obstacles deny Ukraine the opportunity to rapidly advance onto a target or an area in the rear, thus severely degrading one of their key strengths. These obstacles also maximise one of Russia’s key strengths — firepower supremacy — giving them more time to concentrate fire into a potentially denser enemy-populated target area. 

A note on the video embedded above: The thing to take away is how different obstacles can be employed to compliment each other. The dragon's teeth are laid to restrict armour, and the low wire entanglement that's been erected is designed to inhibit dismounted troops. You'll also notice fortified firing positions within a shallow trench network. All in all, it’s a very formidable obstacle. 

Not Just Jumping Hurdles

If Ukraine is to conduct an offensive south from Zaporizhzhia it will likely come across several obstacles. To achieve its objectives or have any success it will have to break through or destroy at least some of these obstacles. These obstacles could be naturally occurring such as rivers, dense woodlands, or marshes. Others could be man-made such as anti-tank ditches, minefields, trenches, or wire obstacles. They may even include a combination of the pair, where Russia tries to exploit a natural geographic feature for maximum effect. I mean, why not man the embankment of a potential river crossing site that the enemy must cross…and the home bank for that matter. Some of the obstacles we’ve seen Russian forces construct include — but are not limited to — a whole series of trench networks, emplaced miles of dragon’s teeth and mines, as well as erect wire obstacles.

In general, obstacle crossings fall within the discipline of 'mobility' or ‘manoeuvre’ for military operations. The actual crossing task is carried out by specially trained units known as combat engineers, a.k.a. Sappers. While other units — such as infantry for example — can conduct a limited range of engineering/mobility tasks after undergoing some sort of specialist training, the task of clearance is generally conducted under a much larger operation involving numerous other units and formations.

Obstacle crossings are amongst the most complex military operations to conduct successfully, especially in a modern conventional theatre of war like Ukraine where there is an abundance of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR). They are the pinnacle of mobility operations in combined arms warfare. They require a competent logistic system as well as a sophisticated ISR network. 

Artillery units are employed to suppress the enemy. Tanks, infantry, and air formations provide fire support whilst engineer units carry out their task — which in Ukraine will likely have to be accomplished under dense artillery fire. An operation attempting to cross a large obstacle will ideally consist of multiple simultaneous crossings. Doing so makes it harder for the enemy to concentrate fire and troops, better conceals the actual objective, gives a higher probability of success, provides more options for commanders, and creates the potential for redundancies. 

Equipment Time: Bring Out the Toys

So, what equipment does Ukraine have to conduct clearance and crossing operations? Luckily for you, yours truly spent a long time trawling through various sites to get the rub on what they have so you don’t have to. I may do a separate article covering these vehicles and equipment in better detail. Numbers are difficult to confirm exactly and there’s differing accounts according to what source is used. 

But to summarise, Ukraine has a number of different bridgelayers, armoured engineer and mine clearance vehicles as well as a few line clearing devices and route-proving assets. It’s also worth noting that Ukraine also possesses boats, barges, and military ferries as well as some hand-built close support bridges. The following, however, is a very brief summary of some their equipment:

Armoured Vehicle Launcher Bridge (AVLB). Around 8-16 M60 Armoured bridge layers from the US and at least 9 Biber bridgelayers from Germany. Ukraine may also be in possession of some Russian/Soviet MT-55, MTU-20, MTU-72 and TMM-3 bridgelaying vehicles. 

A small range of Line Clearing Charges including the M58 MICLIC, a 2-man portable system donated by Sweden (the Minroyjingsorm system) as well as some UR-77 ‘Meteorit’ systems reportedly captured from Russian forces. It's important to note that these have a very limited range from around 100m-200m.

In terms of mine clearance and route proving. Ukraine has been given around 20 LWMR (Light Weight Mine Rollers) from the US. These look as if they're being fitted to the Stryker AFV and have little use beyond route proving in areas/routes suspected of having anti-personnel mines. Germany has donated 4 Minenräumpanzer kelier/MiRPz (which are basically armoured flails) as well as 1 Wisent 1 armoured engineering vehicle which is fitted with the Pearsons Engineering Full Width MinePlough (FWMP). Germany has reportedly pledged 42 Wisent 1’s. 

A note on the Pearsons engineering FWMP while I'm here: This is supposed to be able to take only two direct hits by an anti-tank mine. After that, you'll likely need a change of underwear whilst you struggle to swap it out for a new one. It is used to clear a safe lane AFTER the deployment of a line clearing charge. It is not designed to clear whole minefields. Finland has reportedly donated 6 Leopard 2R's, which is an engineering tank based on the Leopard 2A4 and can be fitted with either a plough or dozer blade. It’s used for clearing operations including minefields. Again, these cannot be used to clear safe lines through properly laid anti-tank minefields. 

Limited Mobility Explained

So, we know how we got here, we know the relevant advantages of each side, we know what obstacles are, what their purpose is, and why they’ve been erected. We also know some of the equipment Ukraine has to cross them. Now let’s look at some of the problems posed by obstacles and the difficulties Ukraine may encounter attempting to cross them.  

Arguably the most difficult obstacle Ukraine is going to come across is a minefield. I’ve seen one other commentator of this conflict pick up on the fact that neither Russia or Ukraine — and by extension NATO — have the ability to assault breach (i.e. clear under fire) a large anti-tank minefield in a modern conventional theatre of war. The lack of suitable equipment, abundance of ISR and widespread use of various artillery systems on the Ukrainian battlefield make this an incredibly challenging operation.

Although the scenes at Vuhledar were vastly overstated by Western media, it does serve as a perfect demonstration of this reality. Not only that, but the underlying tactics of breaching a minefield have barely changed in decades and are no longer applicable on a modern battlefield. Gone are the days where armies have vast amounts of expendable manpower so they can breach a minefield by hand under little more than the cover of darkness and a barrage of heavy gunfire & artillery. 

Ukraine and NATO may have some tricks up their sleeve for this particular operation but I very much doubt it. For the most part, Ukraine is severely limited on specialist mine clearing equipment suitable for the task as well as personnel. The equipment they do have will likely be used to clear key supply routes and areas in the rear. My guess is — and perhaps Russia has laid them with this in mind —  Ukraine will likely try to avoid breaching any large minefield, bypassing it entirely. If they don’t, we will see the scenes of Vuhledar repeated. 

Reality Ain’t So Simple

A note on anti-tank mines while we're here. Anti-tank mines can be fitted with a number of different types of fuses, including a pressure-activated fuse. These fuses can trigger the detonation of an anti-tank mine just by the weight of an average soldier with his/her equipment. So, if you think the problem of getting through an anti-tank minefield can be solved by sending a few units across under the cover of darkness, you may be somewhat disappointed by the results.

Whilst we're talking about specific obstacles. I’ve seen some of the pro-Ukraine crowd mocking the dragon's teeth Russia has emplaced at various points, ignorantly assuming these can just be blown up with a tank round or in some cases driven over. This is unbelievably naïve. I don't even know where to begin. 

Sure, some tanks might be able to blast a path through a dragon's tooth but then not only have they expended ammunition and given their position away but they’ve also created a crater. That crater will then become harder and harder to traverse as more vehicles go through it. They also have the problem that they’ve created a bottleneck that every following vehicle is channelled through. That very same problem would exist if they chose to use an engineering vehicle to doze a path through it as well. 

One should also assume that all of these obstacles will be heavily surveilled by Russian forces, be it with sentries, drones, patrols, etc. Any attempted crossing is likely to be discovered very quickly. Russia then has the choice to either destroy on-site using their overwhelming firepower advantage whilst attempting to clear the obstacle. Or they can allow a path to be cleared through the obstacle and destroy any bridgehead force that attempts to get through it or gets to the other side — in effect sucking Ukraine into a trap of its own making.

Another factor that's overlooked is that any crossing established — plus the approach to and exit from it — has to be maintained. The approaches to established crossing points can become an obstacle themselves. Numerous tracked vehicles going over the same ground can take its toll on the ground, especially in wet, rainy conditions. This leads to vehicles reducing speed and increasing their vulnerability. It reduces access for certain types of vehicles, which can isolate or cut off any successful bridgehead force from its supply lines. 

Close support bridges are notorious for shifting after a few vehicles have traversed over them. If you have inexperienced tank crews this problem is massively exacerbated especially if they are under fire. If they're travelling too fast they can knock the bridge out of position or even fall in the gap. it's not uncommon for bridge layers to return to site and reposition them. 

Even if Ukraine manages to establish a crossing, it has to be maintained and successfully exploited with assaulting units seizing further objectives against fortified positions. It's also worth bearing in mind that if they use an engineering vehicle to establish a crossing like an M60 bridgelayer, it becomes incredibly difficult, and maybe even impossible to reopen that crossing if the vehicle and/or crossing gets taken out afterwards.

Armchair Generals Remain Seated

So, there's a lot of factors at play when it comes to crossing operations. They’re incredibly complex and require certain redundancies in order to pull them off. I have little doubt that Ukraine has the potential to conduct a successful offensive. It still packs a powerful punch and has the means to create large losses for Russia. But if these obstacles have been properly designed, situated and built with the correct force disposition to defend them, it's difficult to see Ukraine successfully overcoming them. 

Ukraine’s equipment limitations greatly reduce their options. Reports are also emerging about Ukraine losing its most experienced troops and struggling to fill its ranks. The training schedule provided to the newly mobilised are insufficient to cover even the basics, let alone complex combined-arms warfare operations. Furthermore, these newly formed Brigades will have a limited time frame and ability in Ukraine to practice such operations. The reported lack in munitions and equipment will inhibit Ukraine’s ability to suppress the enemy, which is the prerequisite for commencing any crossing operation. Without that suppression, Combat/Armoured engineers stand little chance of completing their task.

In summary, what all this means is that the forces involved in any operation will lack the competence and the size required to conduct complex crossing operations. With a lack of munitions and equipment further compounding those issues, it is very difficult to envisage Ukraine having much — if any — success against the more formidable defences. 

This reality will limit Ukraine's options for an offensive by restricting their axis of advance and reducing the likelihood of success. With a number of defence lines established, any successful advance will lose momentum once it reaches the next line. This will give Russia time to withdraw and/or reorganise and limit the destructive potential of any exploitation. Russia will be hoping that any successful breach can be easier isolated and blocked, allowing them to bring in reserves and set up firing points at predetermined positions. In an ideal world, this is how it should work. However the battlefield is a chaotic place — and no plan ever survives first contact.

Author

The author of the article is a former British Army Royal Engineer with over 12 years experience. He specialised in Armoured Engineering, providing mobility and countermobility support to armoured formations. He also deployed on numerous operational tours including Bosnia, Iraq, Northern Ireland and Afghanistan conducting a vast array of engineering and close support tasks.

To the public he simply is Disgruntled Ant.